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ABSTRACT
The Open-Closed Cognitive Dimension and
Divergent-Convergent Abilities
by
Micha e l J. Uhes, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State Un i ··ersity, 1968
Major Professor : Dr . Glendon Casto
De partment: Psychology

The relationship between level of dogmatism and divergent-convergent
abilities was investigated in a sample of

hi~h

school subjects.

Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale, Form E, and tests of divergent and
convergent ability were administered to all subjects .

On the basis

of their pe rformance on the Dogmatism S c ale, three experimental groups

were formed : high, med ium , and lol.• dogmatics.
An anal y sis of the data showed dogmatism to be negatively correlated
with originality, flexibility, composite divergent and composite
conver gent s cores.

Flu ency was the only ability not negatively corre-

lated with dogmat i sm.

High dogmatic subjects performed convergent

o peratio ns better than they performed divergent operations, while low

dogmatic subjec ts performed both operations equa l ly well.
(86 pages )

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Historically , considerations of the roles that beliefs play in our
thinking

/...c.r~b een

left almost exclusively to philosophers and theologians.

In addition, early study usually focused upon the qualitative evaluation
of beliefs;

i .e. , were they consonant with a particular view of the world

(Brehier, 1963).

However,

w~thin

the last three decades the emerging

behavioral sciences have applied research techniques and scientific analys is

to the study of beliefs in order to impartially describe and predict their
relationship to a wide range of cognitive variabl es.
The orderly arrangement of findings based upon behavioral observation

and research techniques led to the development of the constructs of
authoritarianism , ethnocentrism , and social discrimination .

The

defining characteristics of these constructs were the content of one ' s
beliefs; i . e., "what" an individual believed .

This emphasis on content

tended to draw attention away from the ways in which an individual puts
his various specific beliefs together into a total belief structure; i.e.,
"how 1' an individual believed .

However, research has shown ways of structuring

be l iefs not only to exist (Rokeach, 1952), but to remain consistent within
an individual.

This resistance to change belief s becomes apparent as we

note how outmoded ideological trends persist in the face of contradictory
facts and changed social conditions.
Recently , research has begun to focus on the question of "how" a
person believes.

Some studies have focused on the openness or closedness

of a belief system a nd how this is related to one ' s ability to function
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intellec tually.

"Openness and closedness " are used here to describe the

permeability of an individual 's belief system to n ew informat ion .

The

development of theories dealing with o p en and closed thinking place

emphasis not on the content of what a person believes, bu t rather on the

structure of the person's beliefs.

The relative permeabil i t y of the

struc ture of a belief system cuts across spe c ific content; that is ,
the openness or closedness of a belief system is not restr ic ted to a ny
one aspect of a person's thought .

While the study of beliefs has moved fr om considerat i ons of spe cific
content to the overal l s tructure of a belief system , the study of intellect
has moved from t he genera l to the specific.

Early research on this fa c et

of man generall y viewed intellectual func tioning f r om a global view ;

i e. , intellect is a unitary trait .

Only recent l y ha s the structur e of

intellect been seen as the product of a number of cogn itive abilities,

each relatively independent of the other.

In reviewing the development

of theory regarding intelligence , Gui l f ord (1 96 7 , p. v ii ) provides the
following summary:
Most attempts to provide a comprehen sive and systematic

theoretical found at ion to a theory of intelligence have been
abortive becau se of a lack of sufficient i n formation a nd
because of persistent adherence to the belief in Spearman ' s 'g. '
Wi t hin th e br oa d framework of this theoretical background, t h e pre s en t

study dev e loped .

A s tatement of th e specific

p~oblem

for th i s study

follows .

Problem Statement
Rokeach (1960) proposed the existence of a personality dimension
c haracterized by the openness or c los e dnes s of a n individual ' s belief

system; he named this dimension

11

dogmatism . n

There appears to be some
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support for the validity of the construct and the instrument deve loped
to measure it (Rokeach , McGovney, and Denny, 1955; Rokeach and Fruchter,
1956; Fruchter, Rokeach and Novak, 1958).

This res earch will be reviewed

later.

Employing Rokeach 's test instrument , researchers have found a close
relationship between one's level of dogmatism and subsequent success at
performing a wide variety of cognitive tasks.

However, considerabl e

confusion exists regarding exactly what kinds of cognitive tasks are
most clearly related to level of dogmatism.

This point will be discussed

further in Chapter II.
Some writers

(e.g. , Nunnally, 1967) find Guilford's

(1959) theoretical

view of the structure of intellect illuminating in t he sense of clearly
describing what abilities are involved in performing cognitive tasks.
Gu i lford

(1960, 1967 ) has hypothesized the existence of 120 separate

intellectual abilities.

To date

(Hoepfner , Kazero, and Guilfo r d , 1966),

91 abilities have been factorially isolated.
The problem which is the basis for this study is , then, that we
presently have evidence that the openness of a belief system is related
to one's ability to perform cognitive tasks; however, given Guilford ' s
clearcut model of the structure of intellect, we have very little
information as to the exact nature of the tasks involved.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH

Two major areas of research are related to this study .

The first

deals with various theories of beliefs and the nature of belief structure.
The second with the more specific question of the manner in which belief
structure is r elated to one's ability to perform cognitive operations .

The Authoritarian Personality

There were , undoubtedly, many contributing streams of research and

theory in the evolution of the construct of dogmatism.

Fromm (1941)

and Maslow (1943) were among the earliest contributors to the study of
beliefs ; however, the study of dogmatism evolved in large part, from the
early theory and research on the authoritarian personality.
The American Jewish Committee in May , 1944 , invited a group of
American scholars of various backgrounds and disciplines to a conference
on racial and religious prejudice.

One outcome of the meeting was the

development of a research program which would enlist scientific method in
under standing these problems.

The study , which began at a time wh en

a ntiS emitism, especially in Nazi Germany , was of great concern to socia l
scientists as well as laymen, widened over a five - year period into an
exploration of the relation between personality, political ideo logy, and
social discrimination (Adorno, et al. , 1950).
Adorno , et al .

(1950) derived and defined a number of personality

variables, which when taken together, describe what came to be cal led the
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"Authoritarian Personality."

These variables are listed below, together

with a brief definition of each:
a.

Conventionalism.
c lass values .

Rigid adherence to conventional, middle

b.

Authoritarian submission.

Submissive, uncritical attitude

toward idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
c.

Authoritarian a ggression.

Tendency to be on the lookout

for , and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate
conventional values.
d.

Anti-intraception. Opposition to the subjective, the
imaginative, the tender - minded.

e.

Superstition and stereotype . The belief in mystical determinants
of the individual ' s fate; the disposition to think in rigid
categories.

f.

Power and 'toughness.'

Preoccupation with the dominance-

submission , strong-weak , leader-follower dimension; identification
with power figures ; overemphasize upon the conventionalized

attributes of the ego ; exaggerated assertion of strength and
toughness .

g.

h.

Destructiveness and cynicism.
fication of the human.

Projectivity .

Generalized hostility , vili-

The disposition to believe that wild and

dangerous things go on in the world ; the projection outwards
of unconscious emotional impulses.
i.

sex.

Exaggerated concern with sexual ' goings - on. '

(Adorno , et al. , 1950, p. 228)
With the above definitions in mind, the authors original ly developed
the F- Scale, sometimes referred to as the Authoritarian Personality

Scale , in order to provide an index of receptiveness to ant idemocratic

propaganda .

One might say, therefore , that the F- Sca le attempted to

measure the potentially antidemocratic personality.
However, various studies

(summarized in Allport, 1961) have

demonstrated that high scores on the F-S ca l e are associated to a marked
degree with racial a nd ethnic prejudice, and with other forms of hostile
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and autocratic social conduct.

Christie and Jahoda (1954) noted that

scores derived from the scale had been used in studies of prejudice,
leadership , rigidity, adjustment, and group behavior .

Furthermore, the

F - Scale has been found to correlate with intelligence, xenophobia, family

ideology, anxiety, and cooperation in experimentation to name but a few
of the multitude of variables to which it has been related
Hollander, 1957).

(Titus and

It is on the basis of research findings that the F-Scale

has come to be used as an indirect measure of prejudice and underlying
personality predispositions toward a fascist out look on life.
In attempting to clear l y describe the authoritarian persona lity,
Christie and Cook (1958) have provided one of the most comprehensive
summaries of the research on the F-Scale to date.

The amazingly large

number of research studies and the heterogeneous nature of the research
required that their summarization be divided into various categories ;
social sophistication and the F-Scale, political attitudes, authoritarian
ideology and child rearing, interpersonal behavior, prejudice, and psychopathology.

The main points in their summary were as follows:

1.

There is a high positive relationship between scores on the
F-Scale and socia l sophistication; social sophistication being
variously defined as liberality of social outlook , occupation ,
level of education , and socioeconomic level.

2.

The F-Scale is a measure of politically right authoritarianism;
e . g. , adherents of the Communist Party make low scores, while
Fascists make high scores.

3.

There is general support for the hypo thesized relationship
between strict practices in chi l d rearing and subsequent
authoritarian and intolerant beliefs .

4.

Low scorers on the F -S c al e have greater perceptiveness of
others than high scorers. High scorers, interes tingly , are
highly unfitted for the exercise of authority and are ineffectiv e
in solving conf lict situations.

5.

It may be possible to have any degree of mental illness without
showing authoritar i an attitudes, but it may not be possible
to manifest an extreme degree of authoritarianism wi thou t being

psy cho logica lly maladjusted.

(Christie and Cook , 1958 , p . 176- 185)

Following Christie and Cook ' s (1958) comprehensive summary of the
literature , additional research us i ng the F-Sca l e ha s been conducted

on a vari e ty of topics .

For example, Alper , Levin , and Kl ein (1964)

found that subjects scoring high in authoritaria nism were more moralistical l y
conventional in v a lue judgements than subjects s coring low in authoritarianism.

They a lso tend to be more punitive interpersonally (Roberts and J e ss on ,
1958) wh ile str ongly embracing Christian fundamen ta lism (Frymier , 1959;
Rhodes, 1960).
In summary , the research on the authorita r i a n personality describes
a rather paradoxica l i ndividual .

He appears t o be r ather poorly socialized

in many respects , whil e being highly socializ ed in t e rms of seeking
approval from those he sees as above him in an authoritative hierarc hy .
He i s sadistic in his relationships to those below him in such a hierarchy,

while being masochistic to those above him.

While strongly admiring

the qualities he perceives in leaders , he apparently possesses few

leadership gualities himself .

Finally, while strongly verbalizing a

consiste nt and certainly unique set of values , he does not have these

values deeply inter nalized in the sense tha t he ca n comfortably give
them up if authorit y so dicta tes (Weima , 1 965).

Dogmatism : The Open and Closed Mi nd

As noted above , the theory and research on the authoritarian

personality were c entra l in the development of the construct of dogmatism.
However, there were other a ntecedent streams of t ho ught instrumental in
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the evolution of the construct.

Following are examples of the kinds of

thought which influenced Rokeach .
Bell (1963} has described the radical right of the 1960 ' s as a
movement that fears not only Conununism but "modernity" and that in its

equation of liberalism with Communism, it evidences closed and intolerant

thinking to a marked degree .

A similar criticism of extreme l eftist

movements was made by Hoffer (1951} in his analysis of Marxist doctrine .
He expressed the view that civilization has not yet fully recovered
from the transition from the tribal or closed society, with its submission

to superstition, to the open society, which helps set free the critical
capacities of man; and that Marxist doctrine would have civilization
remain a closed society .

Perhaps the sha rpest example of the proposa l t ha t clos ed thinking
is evidenced by the Left as well as the Right , was noted in a speech by
Adlai Stevenson on Communist forms of government.
Every society , I suppose- - including ours- - has individuals who
hunger for conflict, who seem to get a positive joy out of ha ving
an enemy to ha te and destroy and will doubtless miss the cold war
when it finally ends. Indeed it is a rare individual who has in
him none whatever of this warrior urge! But a closed society

goes one fatal step further .

It elevates the closed mind into

an officia l requirement; it ordains struggle a nd conflict as the

highest and perma nent duty of the citizen ; a nd it brands all
those whom i t c a nnot control as actual foes .
(Stevens on , 1962, p . 553}
An inquiry (Popper , 1945} into the nat ure of mass movements ha s
pointed out that the individuals who populate the Left and the Right have
many characteristics in common.

For example , Hoffer (1951} noted that

individuals who are "ripe " for such movements ma y be drawn just as
eas ily to one extreme cause as to another, even though the two positions

may be in direct opposition in terms of political ideology .
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The tendency for such a person to defect from one extreme position
to another extreme position that is in violent competition with the first
has not been an uncommon occurance.

Hitler considered his German

Communist enemies to be a source for potential Nazi party members:
"The petit-bourgeois Social-Democrat and the trade-union boss will never
make a National Socialist but the Communist always will"

1940, p. 234).

(Rauschning,

On the other hand, the Nazi has also been seen as a

source for future Communist recruits (Voigt, 1938)

a

The important

factor appeared to be the necessity for having followers who would be
abso lute in their commitment to an ideological c ause.

That closed thinking is not unigue to particular political ideologies
was noted by Bode (1937) in his explanation of the difficulties faced by
individuals in the United States who are ostracized because th ey happen
to live in

certai~

patterns.

An illustration of the relationship between narrow cultural

communities where the p e ople adhere to narrow cultural

patterns and closed thinking was suggested in Silver ' s

(1963 , p. 5-6)

account of racial problems in his native State of Mississippi:

There are parallels between the 1850 ' s and the 1950 ' s which
remind us that Mississippi has been on the defensive against
inexorable change for more than a century, and that by the time of
the Civil War it had developed a clo sed society with an orthodoxy
accepted by nearly everybody in the state . The all - pervading doctrine,
then and now , has been white supremacy whether achieved through
slavery or segregation , rationalized by a professed belief i n states '
rights and bolstered by religious fundamentalism.
In such a society
a never - ceasing propagation of the "true faith" must go on relentlessly , with a constantly reiterated demand for loyalty to the
united front, requiring that non - ~onforrnists and dissenters from
the code be silenced , or, in a cri sis, driven from the community.
Violence and the threat of violence have confirmed and enforced
the image of unanimity.
It was the above type of speculation, along with v alidated short-

comings of the F-Scale (Barker, 1958; Shils, 1954; Christie and Cook ,
1958), that contributed to Rokeach ' s initia l concern about the open and
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c losed mind

(1952), and which led eventually to the formulation of his

theory on dogmatism and the publication of a summary of his studies
dealing with open and closed thinking

(Rokeach, 1960 ) .

The formulation of Rokeach's theory of dogmatism was preceded
by his own studies of narrow- mindedness and rigidity

(1951 ) .

This pre-

liminary work on narrow- mindedness, prejudice, concreteness of thinking,
and reification in thinking, led to his early efforts to isolate and

measure "the dogmatic personal ity 1'

(1952).

In establishing the construct of dogmati sm, Rokeach (1960)

asserted the bas ic assumption that despite differences in ideological
content , certain uniformitie s would exist in minds structured dogmatically.
He suggested that dogmatism in the religious sphere could be seen in
individuals who were dogmatically Catho lic and individua ls who were
dogmatically anti-Catholic ; similarly, there would be dogmatic theists
and dogmatic atheists.

In the political sphere, according to his

construct , one should be able to observe a lack of permeability to new
information in individuals who were dogmatically conservative and in
individuals who were dogmatical l y liberal.

Dogmatism, according to

Rokeach, is not ne c essarily restricted to religious and political spheres,
but can also be observed in the humanities, in social sciences, and in
philosophy.

In psychology , for example , it should be possible to observe

dogmatic Freudians a nd dogmatic anti - Freudians.
The consideration of dogmatism as not being restricted to any
particular philosophy, religion, political ideology, or scientific point
of view was the primary factor behind Rokeach' s

(1960) efforts to

systematically formulate the notion of the permeability of a person's
beliefs quite apart from their spec ific content , and in such a way that
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the permeability could be measured.

between "formal" content and

Rokeach (1956) differentiated

'substantive"

content~

Closely related to

his concept of structural origanization of bel i efs was the idea of formal
content .

Two persons could differ widely in the substantive content of

their political or religious beliefs , but they could still be similar
not only in permeability of structure , but also in formal content .

That

is, they could both adhere to the belief that there is an Absolute
Authority , A True Bible, and a True Cause; while differing in specific
substantive conten t; e .g., Buddha versus Christ as the Absolute Authority,
King James versus Rheims Douai as the True Bible .
According to Rokeach (1956), three sets of variables were subsumed
under the construct of dogmatism; closed cognitive systems, gene ral
authoritarianism, and general intolerance .

The first variable i nvol ved

the analysis of structural properties ; the other two variables involved
an analysis of formal content .
The following three dimensions we re thought to best describe the
structural properties of a belief system, independent of formal or
substantive conten t:

(1) organization along a central-peripheral dimension,

(2) organization alo ng a belief-disbelief dimension , and
along a time perspective dimension.

(3) organization

With regards to the first of these

dimensions , central - peripheral, Rokeach (1960 , p. 62) assumed that the
more closed the system, the more will the world be seen as threatening,
the greater will be the belief in absolute authority, and the mor e will
peripheral beliefs

(those drived from formal content) be related to each

other by virtue of their common origin in authority, rather than by virtue
of intrinsic connections .

The second dimension, belief- disbel ief,

assumes a system to be closed to the extent that :
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. . there is a high magnitude of rejection of all
disbelief subsystems, an isolation of beliefs, a high discrepancy
in degree of differentiation between belief and disbelief systems,
and little differentiation within the disbelief system.
(Rokeach,
1960 , p . 61)
The third dimension thought to characterize the permeability of a belief

system , time perspective , was founded on the assumption that the evaluation
of information on its own merits requires an orienta tion in the "here and
now . "

If information is to be assessed on its own merits , there is

little need for an overconcern with the remote future or the remote past .

Thus, a system is assum ed to be closed to the extent that an individual
is concerned with the remote future :
. a na rrow, future - oriented time perspective , rather
than a more balanced conception of past, present, and ~ediate
future in relation to e ach other, is seen to be a defining
character istic of closed systems
(Rokeach , 1960, p . 64)
These three dimensions served as the basis for development of
statements used in the Dogmatism Scale.

Construction of the scale will

be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
Since the original development of the Dogmatism Scale , research
on the construct has been mainly concerned with investigating its
relationship with other behavioral indices.

For example , in investigating

the relationship between dogmatism and age , Anderson (1962) administered
an abbreviated form of the dogmatism scale to 290 eighth grade students
and groups of varying size in grades 10, 11 , and 12 .

The author found a

significant decline in dogmatism with increases in age.

Similar research ,

using cross -s ectional sampling techniques, that is , comparing freshmen
against seniors ins tead of the same people against thems elves as freshmen
and seniors, has found dogmatism to be negatively correlated with level
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of educat i on, with the authors concluding that education decreases the

level of dogmatism (Pannes, 1963; Frumkin, 1961; Kamenske, 1966).
With the limited explanatory power of cross - sectional designs, it
seems the above relationships could be more firmly established in a

longitudinal study.

However, it should be noted that the above findings

enj oy popular currency.
Anderson (1962) attempted to determine if the sex of the respondent
was r elated to level of dogmatism.

Positing child rearing patterns as

a possible determinant of heightened dogmatism in females , he found s e x
differences to be nonsignificant, although, when equated for intelligence,
females were more dogmatic than males.

It should be pointed out, however,

that Rokeach (1960), Pannes (1963), and Rabkin (1966) all found little
or no relationship between sex and level of dogmatism.

On the basis of

the present information, the support for a theoretical relationship
between sex and dogmatism must be considered equivocal.
Curious as to the relationship between social class and dogmatism,

Frumkin (1961) administered the Dogmatism Scale, Form E, and the Hollings head-Redlich Index of Social Position to 135 high school students.

He

found dogmatism to be negatively correlated with socio- economic background.

In interpreting his findings, the author yielded to the temptation of
imputing causality where only genera l positive re l at ionships had been
observed.

He summarized his findings by stating that low socio- economic

status had the effect of :
maintaining dogmatism in disprivileged groups by preventing the development of the attitudes and opportunities necessary
to achieve the critical intelligence needed to reduce dogmatism
and a chieve some measure of objectivity .
(Frumkin, 1961, p. 402)
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Presumably, such conclusions were based in part upon previous cross-

sectional studies on the relationship between education and level of
dogmatism.

A siroilarily "loose" interpretation of correlational data

was Block's (1955) determination that restrictive child rearing practices
(as often found in lower socio-economic groups) were the major determinant

of dogmatism in later life.
Employing specially devised Guttman scales, Terhune (1963) found
dogmatism to be positively correlated with patriotic and nationalistic
beliefs in both American and non-American students.
be partially explained by the following studies.

These findings might

Wh ile investigating

the effect of preparatory involvement on goal evaluation in open and

closed belief systems, Wrenn (1962) found that

dogmati~

individuals

value the reinforcement of group thinking more than open-minded persons.
Similarly , Harvey (1963) found that persons who find it easy to conform
to existing group patterns are apt to be more closed in their thinking
than persons who find it more difficult to a ccept group conformity.
The seeming lack of independence in thinking found in studies such

as Wrenn (1962) and Harvey (1963) is reflected in the dogmatic person ' s
tastes in music (Mikol, 1958), art (Frumkin , 1960), and also in his
interpretation of political activities (McCarthy and Johnson, 1962).
The pervasiveness of being "closed" to new information is pointed

out in a study by Kaplan (1963).

Hypothesizing that dogmatism involved

a lack of self-awareness not only in esthetic tastes, but also in physical
perception of the world, he investigated the dogmatic individual ' s ability
to perform sensory discriminations .

Subjects were examined on their

ability to make olfactory, gustatory, tactile, visual, and auditory dis-

criminations .

He found that high dogmatics exhibited lowered sensory
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acuity on five of the six measures.

The visual discrimination task was

the only dimension the two groups could not be differentiated on; and
even on this task the mean differences were in the predicted direction,

close to the .05 level of significance.

The author concluded that the

high dogmatic was alienated from his own experiences and that such alienation

made it very difficult for the closed -minded person to objectify his
environment .

This conclusion is similar to the generally held notion that individuals
with closed belief systems are not as "open"to experience as those with

open belief systems .

The above notion finds empirical support in a study

by Zagona and Kelly (1966).

They found high dogmatics less affectively

accepting of new experiences , while being unable to integrate experiences
requiring the systesis of new material with old.

In attempting to interpret the above fj nd.ings, one might readily
posit the hypothesis that dlienation from experience and inabili ty to
deal with new experiences simple reflects intellectual differences between

high and low dogmatics .

Belief Structure and Cognitive Abilities

In discussing the relationship of dogmatism to cognitive variables,

Rokeach cites an unpublished thesis by Ehrlick (1955) in which the
correlation between dogmatism and intelligence was found to be - .01 .

Similar ily, employing the ACE tests, Rokeach (1960 , p. 222 ) found the
relationship between dogmatism and intelligence to be nonsignificant .
Chris tens en (1963) also found aptitude, as measured by the ACE tests,
to be independent of dogmatism.

However, in another study Rokeach (1960,

p . 262) did find a significant difference in inte lle ctual abilities
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between groups of high and low dogmatics.

Taking note of the divergence

of findings, Zagona and Zurcher (1965) measured the verbal ability of
groups of high and low dogmatics and found the groups constituted
different populations in verbal ability (t-ratio significant beyond the
. 001 level) .
In the light of the equivocal findings on the relationship between
intelligence and dogmatism, it seems reasonable to turn to investigations
of learning ability in order to more clearly understand what variables
are operating in the cognitive functioning of the dogmatic individual.

Rokeach (1960, p. 36) originally thought that cognitive isolation,

i.e ., a severing of potential communication between systems of beliefs
and disbeliefs , was associated with increased dogmatism.

Taking note

of this, Adams and Vidulich (1962) attempted to determine if belief-

congruent: associations \vere more easily learned by low dogmatic persons
than high dogmatic persons.

In order to test Rokeach ' s or i ginal hypothesis

they had subjects, divided into high and low dogmatics on the basis of
Rokeach ' s Dogmatism scale, Form E, learn two paired -a ssociate lists of
noun stimulus and adjective response words on a two-second exposure
interval memory drum .

One list contained fifteen belief-congruent

word pairs, e.g . , physican-ethical, Negro- ignorant , preacher-honest, the
other list contained fifteen belief-incongruent word pairs, e .g., rnomwan't on,

liberty - bad, Conununists - humane .

Surprisingly, high scores on

the Dogmatism Scale were shown to be related, not only to inferior learning
of bel ief-incongruent paired associate lists , but also to inferior learning

on belief-congruent paired associate lists.

The authors concluded that not

only is the high dogmatic inferior in learning incongruent material , but
he may well be inferior in any type of complex learning .
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One of the earlier researchers on this facet of dogmatism, Frumkin

(1961), found a negative relationship between dogmatism scores and grades
in a sociology class .

At roughly the same time, Ehrlich (1961) made an

exploratory study of the relationship between dogmatism and degree of
learning as measured by a sociology test.

After eguating students for

aptitude on the basis of the Ohio State Psychological Examination , he
found degree of dogmatism and success in learning to be negatively re-

lated.

He interpreted these findings as being consonant with Rokeach's

postulated ''closed c ognitive structure."

Christensen (1963) replicated Ehrlich ' s (1961) study with one major
difference.

In addition to controlling for aptitude for school achievement,

as determined by ACE s cores, he had the subjects tested by both essay
and multiple c hoice tests on a learning task in a psychology course .

Aside from finding that aptitude and dogmatism were independent , he found
no evidence that dogmatism was related to classroom learning or ability
to synthesiz e and analyze.
Att empting to resolve the diverse findings of Ehrlich, Frumkin, and

Christensen , Costin (1965) also examined the relationship between dogmatism
and learning ability.

The Rokeach Dogmat i sm Scale, Form E, and a 75 - item

multiple c hoice psychology test were administered at the beginning and
end of a semester to 67 students of an introductor y psychology c la ss.
An estimate of verbal reasoning (SCAT) was also obtained on the subjects.
The results showed that all correlations between dogmatism and postcours e a c hievement were negative, but not significant.

With SCAT scores

held constant the partial r between dogmatism and postcourse achievement
was - . 15 , also nonsignificant .

The author concluded that perhaps the

diverse findings might best be explained by examining the nature of the
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material the subject is to learn; i . e. , dogmatism may be significantly

related to some types of lear ning while not being related to other types.
Some oblique support for this propos i tion is provided in a s t udy by
Rebhun (1966) .

I n examining the relationship between dogmatism and

anxiety , he f ound a positiv e c orr e lat i on between the two varia bles .

He

suggested that high dogmatism may have impaired intellectual functioning
when anxiety was generated in the learning situation.

He further

suggested that anxiety may result from a conflict between the need to

a chieve and the need to e x clude new information.

Perhaps the most extensive study of dogmatism and cogn itive fun c tioning
was done by Zagona a nd Zur c h er (1965) .

They administered Rokeach ' s

Dogmatism Scale to 517 freshmen students in the elementary psychology
cours e at the Univers ity of Arizona .

The 30 highest scorers and the 30

lowest scorers were assigned to specia l d i s c ussion se c tions.

Both long-

term observations and objective tests were employed in the me asureme nt

of the cognit ive variab les of the two groups.
The most striking results of this study were those resulting from
the semester-long c lassroom observations .

Intellectual lethargy character-

ized the atmosphere of the high-dogmat ic classroom.

An unwil lingness

to relat e to the s ubject matte r, the ins tru c tor, and the other students
was noted, as was a hesitancy or fear to respond to the instructor ' s
urging for part ic ipation in c lass dis cussion .

The atmosphere of th e

low-dogmatic classroom was precisely the opposite .

An air of free

discussion p e rme ated all top ics; debates, once started , were difficult to
stop , and class ent husiasm and curiosity we re at a maximum.

Experimentally

orga nized discussion and debating sessions between the two groups also

yielded striking differences.
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Quantitatively, the authors found the two groups differed significantly
not only in learning ability, but also in verba l scores on the College
Qualification Tests a nd Mednick's

(1962) test of remot e - associations,

a purported measure of creativity .

Although the above research findings on the relat ionship betwe en
leve l of dogmatism and intellectual a bilities are not easy to interpre t,
there does appear to be a consistent relationship between dogmatism and
cognitive abilities.

Confusion in the research findings seems to be a

product of how various researchers have operationally defined "c ognitive

abilities "

That is to s a y, psychological literature does not agree on how

to best estimate cogni tive ability .
see Guilford , 1967, pp. 2-21).

(For a full discussion of this matter

To one researcher this cognitive ability

may best be reflected by the ability to learn; in this instance we find
a reasonably consis te nt negative relationship between dogmatism and
cognitive ability.

When one uses scores on tests of aptitude for achieve-

ment as an indices of cognitive ability , the inconsistent findings make
a summary interpretation difficult.

The Structure of Intellect

It was the a bove c onfusion as to what constitutes cognitive

abilities that lead this writer to turn to Guilford ' s (1959) model of
the structure of intellect in order to expe rimentally amplify differences

in cognitive abilities between high and low dogmatics .
During the past two decades, Guilford and his collaborators have
used the factor analytic method to determine the content of a wide range
of ability tests.

He has found it unnecessary to assume a general factor

of intelligence , but has posited instead a large number of factors.

In
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addition , he has devised a scheme which simultaneously incorporates all

the known primary factors of cognitive behavior.

Each of the primary

factors in cognitive functioning can be thought of as possessing a
combi nation of three dimensions:

one referring to the content of the

material dealt with, a second to the operations performed on the ma terial ,

and a third to the products a chieved by the operations.

The model can

be represented by a three-dimensional rectangular solid as shown in

Figure l.
It was the second of these dimensions, cognitive operations, where

differences in level of dogmatism seemed to be most clearly indicated .
Guilford and Hoepfner (1966, p. 3) defines cognitive operations as
the "

. major kinds of intellectual activities or processes; things

that the organism does with the raw materials of information, information
being defined as 'that which t.he organism discrimates ' . "

1'hat dogmatism

might be related to the above activities was pointed out in a study by
Moore (1961).

In examining the relationship between dogmatism and the

c onditioning of verbal behavior , he found the low dogmatic conditioned

more readily than the high dogmatic.

He interpreted this to mean that

the high dogmatic is not as able to make profitable discriminations a mo ng
the raw information he receives from his envirorunent.

Similarl y , Cost in (1965) and others

(Adams and Vidulich , 1962) have

pointed out that the crucial variable in the dogmatic person ' s ability
to function cognitively may be the manner in which he must deal with in coming information .

This notion received strong support from a study done by Kemp (1960) .
In examining the c r i t ical thinking abilities of high and low dogmatics,
he found low dogmatics mor e successful than the high.
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Figure 1 .

A cubical model representing the structure of intellect.
(Guilfor d, 1959, p. 470)
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The high dogmatics had the greater percentage of errors
in those problems which require the study of several factors
or criteria for decision and the deferring of a conclusion
until each factor has been judiciously considered.
(Kemp , 1960,
p. 318)

The author concluded that a low tolerance for uncertainty irnpells
the high dogmatic toward "c losure" .before conside ration c an be given to

each piece of contributing evidence.

This c onclusion was subsequently

validated by Long a nd Ziller (1965) who found a strong negative correlation between dogmatism and four measures of ability to reserve judgment.

Operating on the premise that Guilford ' s (1959) s cheme of cognitive
operations describes the major fashions in which people perform inte llectual
activities, the next question which comes to mind is:

What cognitive

operations are most likely reflected in the noted differences between

high and low dogmatics?
A summary of the research (C".olann, l963) indicated that the operations
which would most likely reflect these differences are the divergent and
convergent operations.

Guilford and Hoepfner (1966) defined divergent

and convergent operations as follows:
Divergent Production. Generation of information from given
information, where the emphasis is upon variety and quantity of

output from the same source.

Likely to involve what has been

called transfer. This operation is most c learly involved in aptitudes
of creative potential.
Convergent Production . Generation of information from given
information where the emphasis is upon achieving unique or conven-

tionally accepted best outcomes . It is likely the given (cue)
information fully determines the response.
(Guilford and Hoepfner,
1966, p. 3)
The major body of research dealing with the operations defined as
divergent refer to this type of production as

11

Creative production . "

It should be noted that Guilford (e.g . , 1965, p. 15) uses divergent
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ability and crea tivity interchangeably :

"It c a n be said that the

divergent production a bilities are the most direct contr ibutor s to

creativ i ty ."

He emphasizes convergent production ab i lities in the

p rodu ction of convent ionall y a ccepted responses.

Similarly , Thorndike

(1963) stated that "divergent-thinking" and "creative-thinking" are
legitimate equiva lent s.

Others , however, d o not view c reative production

in the same fashion (Medniek, 1962) .
As was noted a bove (Wr e nn, 19 62; Terhune , 1963; Harvey , 1963),

the highly dogmatic individua l tends to a ccept group conform i t y , and to
value reinforcement by group thinking .

This embracing of pres c ribed

v iews of the world appears dissonant with research findings on nece ssary
conditions for c reative production.

For example, Ghisel in (1952) des c ribed

creat i vity as proceeding from a feeling of dissa tisfa ction with the

esta blished order and reaching fulfillment in the attainment of a ne,N
order .

Similar ily , Ta ylor

(1964) r eports a study by Barron in whi c h

h e found a p ositive corr ela t ion (r

=

. 7 0) b etween independe nc e of

judgment a nd ratings of c reativity .

Rokeach (1960) found attitudinal rigidity to c onstitute a separate ,
yet related, f a ctor to dogmatism.

Relating this to c reative operations,

Fl eming a nd Weintrau b (1962) found a negative correlation (r = -.41)
between attitudinal rigidity and a b attery of ver bal and non - verba l

of c reativity .

tests

A further study by Dauw and Pugh (1966) on the relation-

ship between c reativity and r e l igious preferenc es , found that an

inordinately small percentage of creative students (1 . 5\) had att ended
Catholic schools.

The a u thor s s uggested that "perhaps th i s inhibi tion of

c reativity was associated with more a u thoritarian or dogmatic tea c hing

tea chniques " (Dauw and Pugh, 1966, p . 35).

That a high level of dogmatism
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may be incompatible with creative production abilities was pointed auf in

Zagona and Zurcher ' s

(1965) study.

They found that groups of students

1

scoring high and low on Rokeach s scale constituted different populations
in regards to their ability to form remote associations; an ability

thought to be related to creative production (Mednick, 1962) .
In conc luding his review of the psychological literature relating
to the study of creativity, Golann (1963) stated what he considers
important in providing a functional understanding of creativity.

Specifically ,

in :
. . . such an approach our criterion variables might be
tolerance for or seeking of ambiguity, openness to experience
internal frames of evaluation of independence of judgment to name
but a few theoretically based descriptive concepts which appear
again and again in the literature and deserve further invest igation .
(Golann, 1963, p. 561)

Taking note of Golann's reasoning, Jacoby (1967) examined the
relationship between open -mind edness and creativity .

Upon administering

Rokeach•s Dogmatism Scale and the Remote Associations Test to 24 subjects,
he found a negative correlation coefficient of - .248.

Though in the

predicted direction, the results did not reach statistical significance
(p = .12).

However, taking note of the rather small sample Nand the

direction of the finding , the author noted that " the results are suggestive
and it appears that further research into the relationship between
dogmatism and creativit y is warranted."

(Jacoby , 1967, p . 822)

Objectives

The objectives of this study were to examine the relationships
between dogmatism and ability to perform convergent and divergent operations.
Three abilities involved in divergent operations .

They are:

spontaneous
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flexibility, the ability to produce a variety of class ideas in connection
with an object or other unit of thought; ideational fluency, the ability
to produce a number of responses; and original ity, the ability to produce
remotely associated, clever, or uncommon responses.

Guilford (1967)

pointed out in a personal communication that the best method of estimating
divergent - convergent production abilities is to administer thos e t e sts
which are heavily loaded on these factors, while keeping the products
and con tents of the productions constant (see Figure 1).

Following this

logic, estimates of convergent abilities which parallel the divergent

abilities in products and constants , were e xamined.

Hypotheses

The following specific hypotheses wer e tested.

Whenever previous

research gave reason, hypotheses were stated in the predi cted direction,
otherwise they were stated in the null form:
1.

There will be a negative correlation between dogmatism scores

and originality s cores.
2.

There will be a negative correlation be tween dogmatism scores

and spontaneous flexibility scores.
3.

There will not be a significant correlation between s cores on

the dogmatism scale and ideational fluen cy scores.
4.

There will be a negative correlation between dogmatism s cores

and the composite divergent a bilities s cores.
5.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will have significantly

different mean originality s cor es .
6.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will have significantly

different mean spontaneous flexibility s cores .
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7.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will not have significantly

different mean ideational fluency scores.

B.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will have significantly

different mean divergent ability scores.
9.

There will not be a significant correlation between dogmatism

scores and the c omposite convergent abilities scores.
10.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will have significantly

different mean convergent abilities scores.

11.

Groups of high dogmatics will have higher mean standard s c ores

on tests of convergent abilities than on tests of divergent abilities.

12.

Groups of low dogmatics will not have higher mean standard

scores on tests of convergent abilities than on tests of divergent

abilities .

CHAPTER III
PROCEDURE

Subjects

Three hundred sixteen high school studen ts 1 1 65 mal e, 151 female,

part icipated in the initial phase of the experiment.

The sample was

the eleventh grade class at Roy Senior High School , Roy, Utah .

The

students , for the most part, came from urban middle - c lass b a ckground s,
notab l e fo r t he homogeneity of its religiou s affiliation.

Although o n -

going research (Shaver and Ri char ds , 1968) indicates that individuals
from this background tend to s core higher on Rokeach ' s dogmatism scale
than other groups , it was not thought to be relevant to this study as
our main concern was within group differences .
The total sample was administered Rok e a ch ' s Dogmatism Scale , Form E,
and Ss' s c ores were used as a screening device to iden t ify the experimental
groups.

The mean s cores and standard deviations, as well as mean scores

and standard deviations from a p r evious resea r c h study with h igh s chool
Ss, are reported in Table 1.

Table 1 .

Means and standard deviations of high school populations on
Rokea ch ' s Dogmatism Scale

Population

X

S.D .

Roy High S chool, Roy, Utah

176 . 27

22 . 85

Kemp & Kohler

1 65 . 75

21.86

(1965 )
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Subjects were placed in the high dogmatic g roup if their scor es

fell in the top 10 percent of the sample population, a nd in the low
dogmatic g roup if t hey fell in the bottom 10 percent o f the distribution.
A fur ther group of those subjects in the middle 10 percent of the
dogmatism distribut ion was c omprised f or an e xtens ion of the study as

previous research had focused only on high and low dogmatics .

Means and

standard dev iations of the experimental groups are reported in Table 2.

Ta b le 2.

Distribution statistics fo r experimental groups

Condition

X

S.D.

N

High Dogmat ic

21 1.06

5.12

30

Medium Dogmatic

171.80

2.52

30

Low Dogmatic

126.80

9.592

30

Having defined the experimental groups on the basis of dogmatism
scores , two estimates of co nvergent abilities were obtained.

Guilford

(1967) pointed out in a personal communication that the best method of
estimat ing divergent - convergent production abilities is to administer
those t ests wh ich are heavily loaded on these factors, while keeping
t he products an d c ontents of th e product ions cons tant

(see Fi gure 1).

With this rationale in mind , the following group tests were

administered :
1.

Alt ernate us e s Te st

(Divergent Operat i ons)

2.

Consequence s Tes t

(Divergent Operations)
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3.

Gestalt Transformations

(Convergent Operations)

4.

Word-Group

(Convergent Operations)

Nam~ng

The tests of divergent operations were chosen because of the

availability of validity estimates; the tests of convergent operations
were then fixed by the need to keep the products
classes) and con tent

(transformations and

(semantic) , cons tant.

S ex

Sex of the respondent was not controlled fo r in setting up the

experimental groups.

As has been pointed out in Chapter II, the results

of research on the relationship between dogmatism and sex is equ i voca l.

It also has been established that sex of the respondent is not related
to performance on tests of divergent abilities .

Wilson , Christensen ,

Merrifield, and Gui lford (1960) found the means for boys and girls on
the Alternate Uses test so nearly identical as to accept the hypothesis
that they came from the same population.
Guilford

Chr istensen , Merrifield and

{1962) found similar results regarding performance on the

Consequences Test (see Table 3) .

Table 3.

Distribution statistics on Cons e quences Test*

Obvious S c ore

Population

N

X

S.D.

Remote S core
X

S .D.

Ninth Gra de:
Boys

229

24.1

8.7

4. 0

3.2

Girls

22 8

26.7

8 .0

4.0

3 .1

*Chr istensen , Merrifield a nd Guilford , 1962 , p. 7 .
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Intelligence

An estllnate of intelligence, the G factor from the General Ap titude

Test Battery

(GATB)

(1947), was available on all subjects.

As the

findings on the relationship between dogmatism and intelligence were no t
clear , an analysis of variance was performed on the experimental groups '

GATS

11

9 11 f a ctor scores.

Research in the field of creativity, i.e . ,

divergent production, has shown that within a relatively homogeneous
intellectual group, there is a negligible relationship between creativity

(test performance) and intelligence.

Torrance (1962) found that if

giftedness in children had been based alone on WISC scores, 70 percent
of the 20 percent most creative children would not have been considered

gifted .

Parnes and Meadow (1963) found no significant relationship

between measured IQ and creativity .

They also found that a course in

creative problem solving was egually helpful to those with high and low
intelligence .

Taylor and Holland

(1962), in a review of creativity

research, reported a correlation of .2 0 to . 40 was found between verbal
measures of intelligence and creative test performance in a variety of

populations.

Taylor (1963) concluded that if an intelligence test were

used as the basis for selecting creative talent , 67 percent of persons
with the highest scores on creativity tests would be missed.

11

If

intelligence and creativity were completely unrelated 1 80 percent would

be missed, but due to a slight relationship , only 67 percent of the topscoring

~reative'

people are missed."

(Taylor, 1963, p. 366)

Getzels

and Jackson (1962) found intelligence to be an important factor in c reative
test performance up to an intellectual level of 115.

Rowever 1 Christensen,

Merrifield, and Guilford (1962) reported a negligible relationship between
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inte lligence and one of the instruments used in this study, the Consequences
Test.

The diversity of research findings on this relationship is summarized

in Table 4.
In a recent factorial analysis of divergent thinking and intelligence,

Maduas

(1967) examined the relationships between verbal and non-verbal

divergent abilities , and verbal and quantitative estimates of intel ligence.

With a population of 609 high school students , the median inter - correlation between the intelligence and divergent thinking measures was .05

A factor analysis of the inter - correlations yielded three distinct
factors; a verbal divergent thinking factor , a non-verbal divergent

thinking f a ctor , and an intelligence factor .

Th e author concluded that

" . . . knowledge of IQ seems to be of little help if one is faced with
a 'formful ' of c l ever boys for the one among them with the lowes t IQ
is almos ·t as likel y to be creative as the one with the highest.' '
(Maduas , 1967, p. 234)
Because of the wide range of research findings, i.e., correlation

coefficients ranging from -. 15 to . 73 with high school subjects--and
the heterogeneous intellectual composition of our population, it was

decided to determine whether or not high and low groups of dogmatics
would hav e different mean scores on the GATB.

Meas ure of the Open and Closed Belief System

Dogmatism Scale , Form E
This scale was developed by Rokeach to measure individual differences
in the openness or closedness of belief systems.

was constructed in a deductive fashion.

The Dogmatism Scal e

That is to say, defining character -

istics of open and closed belief systems were outlined , and then items

Ta b l e 4 .

Some representative correla tions between trad itiona l
of creative potential and performance ~

intelligence-test scores and assessments

Invest igator

Type of Subjects

I ntel ligence Test

Creative As sessment

To rrance (1962)

El ementary grades

Stanford-Bi net
Otis
Kuhlman -l\nderson
Ca lifornia TMM

DP-te st compositeb

.1 6 ; .1 7
.32
.2 6
. 24

High school

Large- Thorndike

DP- test composite

. 30

Torrance (1 96 2 )

Gr aduate students

Miller Analogies

DP- test compos ite

-. 02;

Torran ce (1962 )

Gra duate students

Ohio Sta te PE

DP-test composite

.1 0

D . Ta ylor (1960)

Engineers

Terma n Concept Maste r y

Ratings

.2 0 ; .07

MacKinnon (1961)

Architects
Scientists

Terma n Concept Mastery

Ratings
Ratings

Ri pple , e t al .

Seventh grade

Otis

DP- test scores

Razik (1963)

College

Ohio State PE

DP- t est

Guilford (1966)

Ninth gra de

Ca l i fornia TMM

45 DP- test scores

Yamamoto

(1964)

(1962)

C- Z Verbal Compr ehension

r

.11

-. 08
- .07

s cores

. 11; - . 73

. 04;
(x
- .04;
(x =
-. 15;
(x =

-

-. 70
.32 )
-. 70
. 32 )
-. 52
.21)

~Gui lford,

1967 , p. 1 67 .
bop sta nds for divergent production .

w

"'
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were constructed to tap

hese characteristics .

In item construction, the

following chara cteristi cs were taken as indicative of a closed belief

system.
1.

Isolation within and between belief and disbelief systems;

coexistence of contradictions within the belief system.
2.

Little differentiation be twe en disbelief subsyst ems.

3.

Specific beliefs that :
a.
b.
c.

the world is a hostile place;
the future is uncertain and threatening;
the self is fundamentally unworthy and inadequate to c ope
with this friendless world, and that the way to overcome
such feelings is by a self-aggrandizing and self-righteous

identification with a cause.
4.

A concern with power and status .

5.

Compulsive self-proselytization about the justness of causes .

6.

Viewing authority as being absolute , and rejecting those who
dis agree with one's belief system .

7.

Expression of a time perspective where the present is rejected
for either the past or the future.
(Rokeach, 1960, pp. 73 -80)

The test consists of forty statements to which the respondent

indicates the degree of his agreement or disagreement.

Most of the

items were constructed by the author (Rokeach , 1960) , but a few were
taken from Hoffer (1951), Berger (1952) and the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory

(Hathaway and McKinley, 1943).

Strong agreement

with each statement is taken as an indicator of a closed belief system ,
while strong disagreement with an item indicates openness in the belief

system.
In reviewing the reliability of the dogmatism scale, Lhupe and
Wolfer (1966) reported reliabilities ranging from .69 to .86 .

Rokeach

(1960) reported reliabilities from .70 to .90 in populations of young

34

adults.

These results indicate that subjects do respond rather con-

sistent l y and predictably to the highly diversified statements used in
the Dogmatism Scale.
The validity of the Dogma tism Scal e is somewhat l e ss firmly established .

Early attempts were made to determine whether a new construct ,

dogmat ism, had actuall y been isolated.

Rokeach, McGovney and Denny

(1955) were a ble to fa c toriall y discriminate dogmatism from rigidity
as measured by the Gough-Sa nford Rig idit y Scale.

A fa c tor analysis was

conducted by Rokeach a nd Fruchter (1956) , using a sample of 207 college
students, on scales representing the following ten v ar i a ble s:

anxiety,

para noia, self-rejection, dogmatism, author itarianism, rigidity , ethnocentrism, lib ralism- conservatism, left opin ionation, and r ight opinionat ion .

Conclusions from the analysis indicated that dogmatism was

load ed on an a uthorita rian factor , but was independent of the left-right
dimension .

This finding was confirmed by obtai ning the responses of an

actual left-wing pol i tic a l group , as we ll as a right - wing political

group (Barker, 1958) .

The author concluded that the dogmatism s cale is

a valid me a sure of general authoritarianism.

crimina ble from rigidity and eth nocentrism .

Dogmatism was also dis -

Another fa c torial study by

Fruchter , Rokeach a nd Novak (1958 ), using a Midwestern university student
s ample, produced similar results .

Rokeach (1960) found that when pe er

rating s are used to construct groups of high and low dogmatics, the

groups differ sharply in mean dogmatism s c ores.
Further studies on the c orr elates of dogmatism lend some support
to the val idity of the construc t and the instrument designed to measure
it .

Kemp (1960, 1963) found students low in dogmatism more suc cessful

in critica l thinking tha n students high in dogmatism .

Mikol (1958)
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found high dogmatics less accepting of "new" musi c .

Similarily, Frumkin

(1961) found high dogmatics less accepting of modern painting.

Fidelman

(1962) and Richard (1962) found that level of dogmatism was negat ively
correlated with a ccura cy in perceiving and understa nding others.

These

studies lend support to the hypotheses that the Dogmatism s c ale measures
one's openness to new informa tion.

Tests of Divergent Thinking

The two measures of divergent operations used in the present study
were the Alternate uses Test (Wilson, Chris·tensen , Merrifield, and
Guilford, 1960) and the Consequences Test (Christensen , Merrifield , and
Guilford , 1962).

The Con sequences Test measures one ' s a bilit y to perform

divergent operations on sema ntic material and to produce transformations;
transformations being defined as " . . . changes, revisions, redefinitions ,
or modifications , by which any product of information in one state goes
over into a nother state.

11

(Guilford, 1967, p . 64) .

The Alternate Uses

Test measures one ' s ability to perform divergent operations on semantic
material and to produce classes; classes being defined as

11

•

••

con-

ceptions underlying sets of items of information grouped by virtue of
their common properties.

11

(Gui l ford and Hoepfner, 1966, p . 4).

The tests were designed for group administration .

They are timed

and have a detai led introduction giving examples of t he kind of test
items and appropriate responses .

Neither of the tests demands specialized

knowledge or training on the part of the respond ent.
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Consequences Test
The Consequences Test consists of 10 items , each of which asked

the

~

to state up to twenty possible results of an improbable, or at

least not commonly considered, occurrence.

For example:

"What would

be the results if people no longer needed or wanted sleep?"

Each item

presented four acceptable answers as examples of appropriate responses.
For the above item the sample consequences were:

(2) Alarm c locks not necessary;

(l) Get more work done ;

(3) No need for lullaby song books;

(4) Sleeping pills no longer used .

Each item was on a separate page and

the examinees were given two minutes to respond to each item.
Scoring the respondent's responses on th e Consequences Test yielded

two scores; one for Originality, a second for Ideational Fluency .

Originality is defined by Guilford (19 59) as the unusualness of response ,
remoteness of association, and cleverness .
consequences , it is assumed the

different ways.

~must

In order to produce remote

reappraise the situation in

A remote response must evidence the consideration of

consequences which are distant, temporally or geographically, or some

fairly specific way of adjusting to the changed situat ion .

For example,

the following answers would be scored remote to the question "What would

be the results if it appeared certain that the entire surface of the
e arth would be covered with water except for a few of the highest mountain
peaks?"

(A) No more Hopi rain dances;

meet, swimming;

(B) Olympics would have only one

(C) Eagle farms would replace chicken farms.

Ideational fluency is defined by Chri stensen , Merrifield , and
Guilford (1962) as the a bility to produce rapidly a variety of units of
semantic content , or the divergent production of semantic units.

A high

score for ideational fluency indicates a facility for bringing ideas out
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of memory storage to meet the demands of the situation.

Any relevant

response (relevant being defined liberally) not scored for being remote ,
and not a repetition of a previous answer is scored for ideational

fluency.

The following answers to the above guestion would be scored

as obvious :

(A) People would drown ;

(B) Food shortage ;

(C) Rush to the

mountains.
The originality score is the total of all the responses scored as
remote , and the ideat ional fluency score is the total of all the

responses scored as obvious .

A third score obtained by summing the

total remote and obviou s s c ores and the score for spontaneous flexibility
(from the Alternate Uses Test) , was obtained as an overall estimate of
divergent ability.
With alternate forms, Christensen , Merrifield a nd Guilford (1962)
reported a split half relia bility coefficient of .87 for the obvious
score and .67 for the remote score for ninth graders .

For several young

adult male populations, coefficients of . 86 fo r the obvious and .82 for

the remote score have been obtained (Christensen , l1errifield and Guilford,
1962).
Christensen, Merrifield and Guilford (196 2 ) reported factor loadings
of . 62 for the obvious scores on the ideationa l fluency factor , an d .42
for the remote scores on the originality f a c tor for a young adult ma le
population.

They further point out that such loadi ngs are the best

estimate one can make of construct validity .

"The authors regard

factorial validity , given by the correlation between a test and its
common orthogonal factors , to be the best type of construct validity . "
(Christensen , Merrifield and Guilford, 1962 , p. 4)
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Indirect support for the validity of the Consequences Test has been
provided by the following studies .

Gerry , Devlau, and Chorness (1957)

reported a significant increase in original responses to the Consequences
Test in a pre-post test designed to measure the effectiveness of a

works hQp on creative expression .

In a study designed to investigate the

effects of various methods of training in creativity , Nicholson (1959)
found that the experimental group improved significantly in the production
of remote responses on the Consequences Test.

Drevdahl (1956) reported

that the Consequences Test was able to differentiate significantly
between creative and non-creative groups as independently defined by judges '
ratings.

The ratings were based both on the judges ' own definitions of

creativity and the definition that:
Creativity is the capacity of a person to produce compositions
or ideas which a re essentially novel and previously unknown to the
producer . . . It may involve forming new patterns and c ombinations

of information derived from past experience s, transplanting of old
relationships in new situations; it must be purposeful and goal

directed .

(Drevdahl , 1956 , p. 23)

Za ccaria, Chorness , Gerry, and Borg (1956) reported significant
correlations between ideational fluency and originality, and a
creative activities score derived from biographical inventories.

Drevdahl (1956) found a correlation of .33 between the consequences
remote s c ore and instructors ' ratings of originality of Ss in arts and

sciences .

Guilford , as reported by Drevdahl (1956) found a correlation

of . 37 between ideation fluency and success , as measured by pay raises

for engineers designing aircraft.

Barron (1963) found a significant

correlation of .36 between scores on the Consequences Test
ratings of creat ivity of the individual studied .

and staff

He further found the

scores on the Consequences Test were correlated .59 with a composite
measure of originality based on eight different measures.
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Thus, as a measure of divergent abilities, some support for the
validity of the originality and fluency measures of the Consequences
Test exists.

Alternate Uses Test
The Alternate uses test consists of nine items.
the S with a well known object and its common use .

Each item presents
The examinee is

asked to give as many a s six uses other than the commonly stated one
for the object .
test.

The Ss are given twelve minutes to complete the entire

Alternate Uses is a revised and improved form of the test, Unusual

Uses , which was designed as a measure of a hypothesized factor of
flexibility of thinking (Guilford, Merrifield , and Cox , 1961) .
In several ana ly s es (Wilson , Christensen , Merr ifield , and Guilford ,
1960) , Unusual uses had its heaviest loadings on t he facto r ca lled
"spontaneous flexibility."

The essential feature of spontaneous

flexibility is that it represents the ability to produce a variety of
class es of idea s even though a change of use categor y is demanded with
every response (Guilford , 1967, p. 145) .

Spontaneous flexibility is

this ability to change sets in a situation in which the direction of
the change is restricted by the stimuli.

Each new and different use of

an object belongs in a different cla ss of idea s .

An accep table r espo ns e

must be possib l e , diffe r ent from the given u s e , a nd s pecific .

For

example , the object might be a newspaper , and the common use stated
as reading .

Acceptable a dditional uses might read :

a.

Start a fire

b.

Wrap garbage

c.

Swat flies
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d.

Stuffing to pack boxes

e.

Line drawers or shelves

f.

Make up a kidnap note

Unacceptable answers might be:
a.

F ind something in want ads ; not different from the given use

b.

Wrap fresh fish ; same as b above , no r eal cha nge in use

c.

Stimulation ; too general

Using samples of young adults, Wi lson , Christensen, Merrifield and

Guilford (1960) reported reliabilities ranging from . 68 to .81 .

With

four samples of ninth grade students (Guilford, Merrifield, and Cox ,
1961), the estim ates were from .62 to .85.

In a more recent study ,

Guilford and Hoepfner (1966) reported Kuder- Richardson estimates of
reliability of . 81 for 271 male and female, junior and senior students
at a high school in a middle- class urban area.
In adult samples, the test ' s factor loadings on spontaneous flexibility have been . 51 and .52

Guilford, 1960).

(Wilson, Chris tensen , Merrif ield, and

On the basis of a factor analysis of divergent abilities

in senior high school Ss, Guilford and Hoepfner (1966) considered the
Alternate Uses Test to have the highest factor loadings on the factor
of spontaneous flexibility.
Indirect suppor t for the validity of the Al t er na t e uses Test is
provided by several studies.

Maltzman , Simon, Ra skin , and Licht (1959)

studied the effect of the amount of training with free association
materials on the performance of tests of originalit y .

An earlier form

of the Alt ernate Uses Test, the Unusual Uses Test , was found to differentiate

between the control and experimental groups .

Barron (1963) reported a
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correlation of .30 between Unusual uses and staff ratings of creativity.

In Barron ' s

(1963) study, a correlation of .60 was found between the

Unusual Uses measure and a composite original ity measure based on eight

a dditional tests.

Drevdahl (1956) found a significant correlation

betwe en instructor 's ratings of Ss' creativity and nine of Guilford ' s

tests, among them, Unusual uses.

In a review of creativity criteria , Taylor a nd Holland (1962.)
point to the tenative nature of all measures of creative ability.

Thorndike (1963) points out that the construct of creativity itself must
be regarded as being quite tentative; that is to say, creativity may
actually be a misnomer, becaus e spontaneous flexibility, originality,

and fluency are all highly independent abilities.

Guilford ' s tests have

the advantage of having been widely used , and of all being loaded on the
f a ctor of divergent production ability.

Although their validity is not as

well established as might be desired, e . g. , factor loadings as low as . 42,
other tests of divergent ability have not been found to be more valid.
Tests of Convergent Thinking
Gestalt Transformations Test
This test is a measure of one ' s a bi lity to perform convergent operations

on semanti c material and to produce transformations

(see Figure 1) .

With our selection of the Consequences Test (divergent operations on

semantic material produ cing transformations) the use of Gestalt Transformations became a logical choice.
The Gestalt Transformation Test consists of twenty items .

Each item

presents the S with a problem which may be solved by using a part of one
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of the five objects given as choices .

The items present the S with a

situation in which same kind of chang e in information is needed to
a chieve a goal and only one particular tra nsformation will do.

example :

For

the subject is presented with the problem of "starting a fire"

and given the following five objects to use in solving the problem :
(a) a fount ain pen; (b) an onion;
(e) a bowling ball .

(c) a pocket watch;

(d) a light bulb ;

The correct answe r would be " c " as the crysta l

from a pocket watch could be used as a magnifying glass to start a fire.

The Ss are given ten minu tes to complete the test.
At first thought, the factorial intersection of convergent operations
with transformations might appear to be incongruou s, the one suggesting
a kind of rigidity, the other a flexibility .

However, factor analysis

revealed su ch a conjoining of the two factors to exist (Guilford , 1967) .
When the matt e r is put in terms other than flexibility and rigidity,
the convergent production of transformations seems more reasonable.

There

are situations in which some kin d of c hange in information is needed
in order to achieve a certain goal and no other change will do.

With

the Consequences Test, the transformations are divergently produced as

the way is open a nd breadth of search is desirable .

But , when the

conditions are so restricted that only one particular transformation will
do , we have convergent production .

Such is the task provid ed by the

Gestalt Transformation Test (Guilford, 1967).
A Kuder-Richardson estimate of reliability of . 72 was obtained with
junior and senior students at a high school in an urban middle-class
ar ea (Merrifield , Guilford , Christensen, and Frick, 1960) .
The validity of the Gestalt Transforma tion Test ha s been barely
tested using the factor a nalytic model.

Guilfor d (1967) reported only
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"moderate" factor loadings on the c onvergent-semantic - transformation
f a c tor.

Though it was readily apparent that the Gestalt Transformation Test

is a new test in the experimental stage of development , it was employed
in this study because it provided a measure of an individual ' s divergent
a nd convergent abilities with products and contents held constant .

Word Group Nam ing Test
Each of the 16 items on the Word Group Naming Test presents the
respondent with five words that are all alike in same way.
to provide a name for each group of five words.

The S is

The items present the

S with a situa tion which calls for him to converge upon an appropriate
name or summar izing word for the given informa tion.
the five words, volcano, oven , Africa , fire , and su n ,

For exampl e , given
the~

a term which names the unifying property of the five words.

must provide

Acceptable

responses for the above example might be hot things, or warm things .
had six minutes to complete this test.

Ss

Just as the Gestalt Transformations

Test provided a t ask similar to the Consequences Test, varying only the
t y pe of cognitive operation , the Word Group Naming Test provides a task

which allows only the type of operation to vary from the Alternate Uses
Test.

Just as the Alternate Uses Test calls upon

the~

to diverge and

find many uses for a singl e object, the Word Group Naming Tes t c alls upon
the subject to employ sema ntic units in a convergent fashion by finding
a single unifying characteristic for several words .

Guilford

(1967) claimed a "strong" factorial loading for this test

on the conve rgent-s emantic - un its factor , although the exact loading was
not reported.

I n a population of high school juniors and seniors , male

and female, a Kuder - Richa rdson reliability estima te of .61 was obtained .
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As with the Gestalt Transformation Test , the Word Group Naming
Te st is an experimental test.

Howe ver, when used in conjunction with

the Alternate Uses Test, it does provide a measure of divergent and
c onv ergent abilities with contents held constant .

Th e Dogmatism Scale, Gestalt Transformations a nd Word Group Naming
tests are objectively scored with no interpretation c a lled for.

Scores

on the Dogmatism Scale were obtained after weighting answers from 1
for strongly disagreeing with an item to 7 for strongly agreeing with an
item .

An S ' s score is the sum of the weightings for the forty items.

The scores fo r the Word Group Naming and Gestalt Transformations tests
are the total of a ccepta ble answers.

A total score for convergent

production ability was obtained by summing the totals on both the Word
Group Naming and Gesta lt Transformations tests.
The Alternate Uses and Consequences tests, on the other hand,
necessitate scorer judgments.

Principles and explicit examples of

appropriate scoring are given for each item in the tests

(Wilson,

Christensen, Merrifield, and Guilford, 1960; Christensen, Merrifield,

and Guilford , 1962).
In order to establish interscorer reliability , two judge s scored

the two tests for a sampl e of 25 Ss.

Using the Pearson product-moment

correlation coefficient , the interscorer reliability on the Alternate
Us e s Test was .98 .

For the originality score on the Consequences Test,

the interscorer reliability was . 79, while for the fluency score on the
Consequences Test , it was .95.

These correlations were considered

sufficiently high to indicate reliable scoring.
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A composite divergent abilities score was also obtained .

The

weightings used to obtain the composite score were a weighting of one
for ideational fluency , two for originality, and two for spontaneous

These scores cover three of the six factors

flexibility (Deak, 1966).

of verbal or semantic divergent production and are thought to provide a
reasonable estimat e of divergent abilities.

Statistical Techniques
When hypotheses were so stated that a measure of relationship
between two variables wa s desired, the Pearson product- moment correlation

coefficient was used (Edwards , 1962, p . 147) .

When hypotheses were so

stated tha t we wished to estimate differences b etwe en groups, the analysis

of variance was used (Edwards , 1962, p . 321) .

When a significant F was

obtained , comparisons between groups was done according to a method

outlined by Scheffe (1953) .

Scheffe ' s method is generally regarded as

being more rigorous than other multiple comparison methods, and it leads
to fewer significa nt r esults.

errors (Ferguson, 1966) .

However, it also leads to fewer Type I

In two instances (Hypotheses 11 and 12) a

single group of subjects was studied under two separate conditions .

In

these instances , the significance of the difference between the c orr e l ated
group me a ns was computed according to a method outlined by Fe r guson

(1966, pp. 169-1 71) .

Summary of Experimenta l Procedure

The following is the experimental sequence :
1.

Three hundr ed sixteen senior high school students, 151 female ,

165 ma le , were administered Rokeach ' s Dogmatism Sc a le , Form E.

Two hundred
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seventeen of our Ss were drawn from t he morning social studies sections .
This portion of our sample was ass igned to this section by c omputer, and
there was no reason to suspect tha t a ny systematic affect relevant to
thi s study o p e rated in the comput e r ized ass ignments.
2.

Dogmatism scores and two es timates of c onvergent ability and

two es timates of divergent ab i l i t y were obta ined on the original population.
3.

On t he basis of scores on the Dogmatism Scale, three experimental

groups were identi fied from our total sample population :

4.

a.

High Dogmat ic (N

b.

Medium Dogmatic (N

c.

Low Dogmatic (N

~

~

30)
~

30)

30)

Pearson product-moment corr elation coefficients were obta ined

on the subjects ':

5.

a.

Dogmatism scores and or iginality s cor e s.

b.

Dogmatism score s and spontaneous flexibility s c ores.

c.

Dogmat i sm scores and ideational fluency scores.

d.

Dogmat i sm scores and composite divergent ability scores.

e.

Dogmat ism scores and c ompo site convergent a bility scores.

Analysis of variance was p e r formed on the following g roup scores

to de t e rmine if the means we re sig nificant ly different:
a.

High/ medium / and low dogmatics • originality scores.

b.

High, medium 1 and low dogmatic s • spontaneous flexibi lity scores.

c.

High , medium and low dogmatics ' ideational flue ncy score s.

d.

High, medium and low dogmatics ' c omposite divergent ability
s c ores .

e.

High, medium , a nd low dogma ti cs ' composite conver gent
ability scores.
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f.

High, medium, and low dogmat ics• ''g" factor scores fran

the GATB.
6.

T-tests were performed on the

allowing group scores to determine

if the group scored differently on the two measures:
a.

High dogma tics composite convergent and composite divergent
scores.

b.

Low dogmatics compos ite convergent and composite divergent
scores.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

A coefficient of internal consistency was obtained on each of the
measures used in the study .

The measures were so scored that from each

test we obtained two scores: one for the even numbered items and one
for the odd numbered items .

A Pearson product-moment correlation

coefficient was then computed between these two sets of scores.

As our

obtained reliability coefficient was the equivalent of one of a test of

hal f the size of our original test , each obtained correlation coefficient
wa s corrected by means of the Spearman- Brown prophecy formula
1962 , p . 177).

(Edwards ,

The means, standard deviations , and corrected reliability

coefficients of ea ch of the measures are reported in Table 5.

Table 5.

Distribution statistics of the experimental tests

Measure

S.D.

r

N

X

Remote Score
Obvious Score

184
184

5.04
28.12

3.93

. 68

10 . 76

.83

Alternate Uses Test

184

13.86

6 . 37

. 77

Word Group Naming Test

184

7.6 2

3.19

. 76

Gestalt Transformations Test

184

7 . 81

3 . 11

.64

Dogmatism Scale, Form E

184

169 .35

26.25

. 79

Consequences Test
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The above relia bility coefficients are consonant with previously

obtained estimates.

While it would be desirable to employ instruments

having higher relia bilities, correlations from . 64 to .83 are thought to
be sufficiently high to use in differentiating among groups (Garrett, 1964).

Intelligence

Because of the l a ck of consistency in previous research findings

on the relationship between level of dogmatism and intelligence, an

analysis of variance was performed on the "9" factor scores , from the
GATB , for the experimental groups.
level of dogmatism and

sample .

Table 6 .

11

A correlation coefficient between

9" factor scores was computed f0r the total

The results are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8 .

Distribution stat istics for experimental groups on "g" factor
scores

Group

N

X

S .D.

High Dogmatic

25

103 . 12

12 . 96

Medium Dogmatic

25

107 .8 8

12.16

Low Dogmatic

25

111.80

16.98

so
Analysis of variance for th e d ata in Ta ble 6

Tabl e 7 .

df

Sum of
Squares

Mean
Square

2

94 4.72

472 . 36

72

14 , S01.28

201 . 40

74

1S ,44 6 .00

Source of

var i at ion

Between Groups

Within Gro ups
TOTAL
df = 2/72

Table 8 .

F

3 . 13

P<

.OS

f = 4 . 92

P<

F

2 . 34 N.S.

.01

Pe arson Product-Moment c orre lation coefficients between level
of dogmatism and "g" f a c tor scores

Level of Dogmatism

"g" fa c tor

- . l31 N. S .

As our obtained F of 2.34 and r of -. 131 are not significant , we
mus t c onclude that our exper imental groups and total sample are homogeneous

with regard s to the ir GATB scores .
Mada us '

As a result of this finding , and

(19 67) finding regarding the i ndependence of intell ectual measu r es

and d i vergent abilities, it was decided not to control further for l evel

of intellige n ce as mea sured by the GATB.

Level of Dogmatism a nd Divergent Abilities

In ord er t o gain the most comprehensive picture possible of the
rela tionship be t ween level of dogmatism and diver gent a bilitie s,
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hypotheses we re develop ed and t ested which allowed an assessment not
only of the correlation throughout a tota l

sample , but also an a nalysis

of variance between the variables in two extreme samples .

Hypothesis 1 stated that th er e would be a negative corr e lation
between scores on the dogmatism scale and originality s c ores.

Hypothesis

2 stated that there would be a negative c orrelatio n between s c ores o n

the dogmatism s cale a nd spontaneous flexibility scores.

Both of these

hypotheses were confirmed in a correlat ional analysis on 184 S s .

The

results are presented in Tabl e 9.

Table 9.

Pearson Produ ct- Moment corr elation c oeffi cients between level
of dogmatism and original i t y and spontaneous flexibility
scores

Level of Dogmatism

originality

- .293 *

Spontaneous Fle xi b il ity

-.1 97 *

*P

<

.01

Hy pothesis 3 stated that there would be no correla tion between
s cores on the dogmatism sca le and ideational fluency scor es.

hypothesis was retained .

The

The data is reported in Tab l e 1 0 .

Hypothesis 4 sta ted that there will be a nega tive correlation
between scores on the dogma tism scale a nd the composite divergent
a bilities scores.

a na lysis on 1 84 Ss .

The hypothesis was confirme d in a c orrela tional

The results are presented in Ta ble 11 .
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Table 10.

Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficient between level
of dogmatism and ideational fluency scores

Dogmatism

I deational Fluency

Tabl e 11 .

-. 145 N. S.

Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficient between level
of dogmat ism and composite dive rgent abilities s co res

Level of Dogmatism

Composite Divergent Ability

-. 26**

As can be seen from the above findings, the level of dogmatism is
negatively correlated with flexibility , originality, and composite
divergent ability scores , while being unrelated to ideational fluency
scores .

This relationship was further analyzed through an examination

of the experimental groups ' performances on these tests.
Hypothes is 5 stated that groups of high and low dogmatics would
have significa ntly different mean original ity scores.

An analysis of

variance was performed on the scores of the experimental groups on this
test.

The results are reported in Tables 12 and 13.
Finding a significa nt F, a compar ison of group differences, two at

a time, was done according to methods developed by Scheffe (1953) .
results are reported in Table 14.

The
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Tabl e 12.

Distribution statistics of experimenta l groups on originality
scores

Group

N

High Dogmatic

S.D.

X

30

3.73

2. 827

Medium Dogmatic

30

5.40

3.458

Low Dogmatic

30

9 . 27

5.860

Ta b l e 13.

Analysis of Variance for data in Table ll

Source of

Variat ion

df

Between Groups

Within Groups
TOTAL
df

**P

2/87

<

F

Sum of
Squares

Mean Sq .

2

483.47

241.74

87

1 , 574.93

18.10

89

2 , 058.40

F

13 . 35**

4 . 88

. 01

Table 14.

Mean differences between experimental groups on the originality
mea sure

High Dogmatic

High Dogmatic
Medium Dogmatic
Low Dogmatic

**P< .01

Medium Dogmat ic

1.67 N .S.

Low Dogmat ic

5.54**
3.87**
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As can be seen from Table 14, groups of medium and high dogmatics
do not have significantly different origina lity scores.

Low dogma ti cs

score higher than either medium or high dogmatics.

Hypothesis 6 stated that groups of high and low dogmatics will
have significantly different mean spontan eous flexibility scores .

An

analysis of variance was performed on the scores of the experimental

groups on this factor.

The results are reported in Tables 15 and 16 .

Finding a significant F, a comparison of group differences was done

again using Scheffe ' s

(1953) method.

The results are reported in

Table 17.

Table 15.

Distribution statistics of exper imental groups on flexibilit y
scores

Group

N

S . D.

X

High Dogmatic

30

12.60

5 . 523

Medium Dogmatic

30

14 . 36

4. 700

Low Dogmatic

30

16 . 56

7.320

Table 16.

Ana l ysis of variance of the data in Ta ble 14

Source of

var i ation
Between Groups

Within Groups
TOTAL
*P< .05

df

Sum of
Squares

Mea n Sq.

2

236.96

118.48

87

3 ,246.53

37.31

89

3 , 483.49

F

3 . 175*
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Table 17.

Mean differences between experimental groups on the
flexibility measure

High Dogmati c

Medium Dogmatic

1.76 N. S.

High Dogmatic

Low Dogmatic

3.76*
2 . 20*

Medium Dogmatic
Low Dogmatic
*P

<

.OS

As can be seen in Table 17, high and medium, and low and medium
dogmatics have the same mean scores on the flexibility measure, while

low dogmatics score higher than high dogmatics.

Thus , hypothesis 6

is retained.
Hypothesis 7 stated that high and low do gmatics would not have
significant ly different mean ideational fluency s cores .

An analysis of

v ariance was performed on the s cores of the experimental groups on this
test .

The results are presented in Tables 18 and 19 .

Table 18 .

Distr ibu t ion statistics of experimental groups on fluency s c ore s

Group

N

X

S. D.

High Dogma ti c

30

23.80

10 . 6 9

Medium Dogmatic

30

28. 7 3

10.78

Low Dogmatic

30

29.33

11.51
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Table 19 .

Analysis of variance for the data in Table 17

Source of
variation

Sum of
Squares

df

Between Groups

Within Groups
TOTAL

Mean Sq .

2

553.16

276.58

87

10 , 189.33

117.11

89

10,722.49

F

2.37 N.S.

As our F did not reach the .05 level of significance, the hypothesis
that groups of high and low dogmatics will not have significantly
different mean ideational f luency scores, is retained.
Hypothesis 8 stated that groups of high and low dogmatics would
have significantly different mean divergent ability scores.

An analysis

of varia nce was performed on the composite divergent abilities scores
for e a ch of the experimental groups.

The results are reported in Tables

20 and 21.

Table 20.

Distribution statistics of experimental groups on c omposite
divergent abilities scores

Group

N

X

S . D.

High Dogmatic

30

58.73

20.50

Medium Dogmatic

30

68.60

20.12

Low Dogmatic

30

74 . 66

30.49
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Table 21.

Analysis of variance for the data in Table 17

Source of
va riation

df

Between Gr oups

Within Groups
TOTAL
**P

~

Sum of
Squares

Mean Sq .

2

7 , 702.50

3 , 851.25

87

50 , 879 . 73

584.8 2

89

58 , 582.23

F

6 . 58 **

.01 , an F of 4 . 88 i s needed to reach the .01 level of significan ce.

As our obta ined F of 6.58 was significant, a comparison of groups,
two at a t i me, was done

(Scheffe , 1953}.

The results are reported in

Ta ble 22.

Ta ble 22 .

Comparisons of experimental mean differences on the c omposit e
dive r gent abi l ities s cores

High Dogmatic

High Dogmati c
Medium Dogmati c

Med ium Dogmat ic

9 . 87 N.S.

Low Dogmatic

15. 93 **
6.06 N.S.

Low Dogmat ic
**P <:::: .01

As c a n be seen from Ta b l e 22 , low dogmatics score higher than high

dogma t ics on tests of divergent abilities, while me dium and high , a nd
medium and low dogma tics do not differ .
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Level of Dogmatism and Convergent Abilit_ies

Our hypothesis regarding level of dogmatism and convergent abilities
were stated and tested so as to a llow not only for an assessment of the
correlation between the two variables in a total sample, but also an
analysis of variance in the extreme groups.
Hypothes is 9 stated that there would no t be a significant correlation
between dogmatism scores and the composite convergent abilities scores.
The hypothesis was rejected.

The results of a correlational analysis

on the total sample is presented in Ta ble 23.

Table 23 .

Pearson Product-Moment correlation coefficient between level
of dogmatism and composite convergent abilities scores

Level of Dogmatism

Composite Convergent Ability
*P

<:

-.1 83*

.05

Hypothesis 10 stated that groups of high and low dogmatics would
not have significantly different mean convergent abilities scores .

An

analysis of variance was carried out on the composite convergent ability
scores of the experimental groups.

The results are presented in Ta bles

24 and 25 .
As our obtained F was significant , a comparison of the group means
was done (Scheffe, 1953).

The results are reported in Table 26.
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Tabl e 24.

Distribution statistics for experimental groups on composite
convergent ability scores

Group

S.D.

X

N

High Dogmati c

30

14.86

5.08

Medium Dogmatic

30

15.56

4 . 19

Low Dogmatic

30

18.60

4 . 20

Table 25.

Analysis of variance for the data in Table 23

Source of
variat ion

df

Between Groups

Within Groaps
TOTAL
* *P

<

Sum of
Squares

2

236.29

11 8 . 15

97

1,766 .03

20 . 29

89

2 , 002 . 32

5.82 **

Comparisons of experimental me an differences on the composit e
convergen t ability scores

Hi gh Dogma tic

High Dogmatic
Medium Dogmati c

Low Dogmati c

<

F

.01 , an F of 4.88 is needed to rea c h the .01 l evel of significance .

Table 26.

*P
**P <

Mean Sg .

. 05
.01

Medium Dogma tic

. 70 N .S .

Low Dogmatic

3.74 **
3 . 04 *
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As can be s een in Tabl e 26, th e me an of th e medium dogmat ic s is not
dif ferent from the mean of the high dogma tics.

However, the me an of the

low dogmatics was higher than that of either the medium or high dogma t ics.
In o rder to assess the divergent and c onvergent abilities of both

high and low domatics, taken s e parately , the following hypoth e ses were
stated and tested.
Hypothesis 11 stated that groups of high dogmatics would perform
co nvergent operations better than divergent operations .

In order to

t e st th i s hypothesis the raw composite c o nve rgent and diverge nt ability
s c or e s for each individual in the high dogmatic group wer e c onverted to
standard scores .

At test of the di ff e rences betwe en two means from

correlated samples was computed according to a method outlined by

F e rguson (1966, pp. 169- 171).

Tdble 2 7 .

Ability

The results are present ed in Tabl e 2 7.

T-Te st of th e differenc es between divergent and c onvergent
abilit ies of high dogmatics

High Dogmati c X

Conv e rgent

-.029

Diverg e nt

-.315

t

2 . 193*

*P

<

. 05

As c an be seen in Tabl e 27 , groups of high dogmatics do perform
converg en t operations bett er tha n they perform divergent operations;
ther efor e , Hypothesis ll is retained .

Hy pothesis 12 stated that groups of low dogmatics would perform
conver gent and divergent operations equally we ll.

In order to test this

hypothesis, the raw composite convergent and divergent ability scores
were converted to standard scores .

A t-test of the differences between

two means from correlat ed samples was again computed according to a method

outl i ned by Fergus on (1966, pp. 169- 171).

The results are presented in

Table 28.

Table 28.

Ability

T-Test of the differences between divergent and convergent
abilities of low dogmatics

Low Dogmatic X

Convergent

.594

Dive r gent

.612

t

.021 N. S .

As can be seen in Table 28, groups of low dogmatics perform convergent

and divergent operations equally well; hypothes is 12 is retained.

CHAPTER V
DISOJ SSION

As was seen in the previous chapter , significant differences wer e
found between dogmatism and divergent and convergent ab ilities in almost
every instance .

The meaning of these findings, as well as their impli -

cations for further research will be discus sed below.

Intelligence

As the review of the literature pointed out, most investigat ions

(Ehrlick , 1955 ; Rokeach , 1960; Christensen, 1963) of the relationship
between dogmatism and intelligence have found the two variables to be

independent.

However , Zagona and Zurcher (1965) did find high and low

dogmatics to differ; the low dogmatics scoring higher on intelligence
tests.

The noted differences in l earning ability {Adams and Vidulich,

1962; Frumkin, 1961) and problem solving t echniques (Kemp, 1960 ; Long
and Ziller, 1965) further make one suspect that groups of high and low
dogmatics constitute different intellectual populations.

However, an

analysis of variance of the extreme groups of high and low dogmatics in
the present study, did not show a difference in intellectual ability as
measured by the "g" factor from the General Aptitutde Test Battery .

Aside from the theoretical difficulties as to whether a "general " factor
of intelligence actually exists , the "g" factor fran the GATB is a
reliable measure and it is considered by some psychologists to offer a
"good" estimate of general intelligence (Taylor, 196:3, p. 715) .
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An inspection of the data revealed differences in the group means

with IQ scores increasing as dogmatism decreased.

However, the differences

failed to reach an acceptable level of significance.

This trend might

be a ccoun ted for by the large standard deviations of our experimental

groups.

For example , in our high dogmatic group we had individuals

ranging in intelligence from 81 to 133 .

The within group variation was

even more marked in our low dogmatic group with scores from as low as

79 to as high as 139.

Apparently , one can be either high or low in level

of dogmatism regardless of level of intelligence.
It was therefore concluded that our experimental groups were homogeneous along the dimension of "int el ligence."

This finding is consonant

with Rokeach ' s (1960) original hypothesis on the independence of dogmatism
and intelligence , and the research findings of Ehrlich (1955) , Rokea ch
(1960), and Christensen (1963) .

It further gives our results on the

relationships between level of dogmatism and divergent and convergent
abilities more explanatory power than would have been the case if our
groups had differed in general intelligence.

Level of Dogmatism and Divergent Abilities

The data are quite c l ear with regards to the relationship between
level of dogmatism and div ergent abilities.

In every instance , save one ,

the two dimensions are negatively correlated .

The more dogmatic an individual, the less original he is in a
problem solving situation.

The more dogmatic an individual , the less

he can change direction or modify hia approach to a problem; i.e . , the

less flexible he is

The only divergent dimension not related to level

of dogmatism , is ideational fluency.

That is to say, level of dogmatism
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is not correlated with the number of responses an individual can make in
a problem solving situation.

However, when responses are evaluated

either for originality or flexibility, differences appear.

The differences between level of dogmatism and divergent ability
are more evident in the findings on the extreme groups ' performance.

The experimental group s of high and low dogmatics were found to have
significantly different mean originality scores.

The low dogmatic group

was superior to either the medium or high dogmatic group, while the medium

dogmatics did not differ from the high dogmatics in or iginality.

This

finding is helpful in interpreting the magnitude of the correlation
coefficient between level of dogmatism and originality which was -.29.
As was seen in Tables 11 and 12, most of the between group variance was

a ccounted for by the magnitude of the difference between the low group
and the other two groups .

As our obtained F of 13.86 far exceeded the

.01 level of significance, it seems that the relationship between
dogmatism and originality is not a linear one in our sample.

Only further

res earch on a broader population c an determine if the tendency found in

this study for level of dogmatism and originality to be more highly
correlated in the lower levels of dogmatism than in the higher levels of
dogmatism , is a general pattern .
The essence of an original response has been outlined by several

authors (Ghiselin, 1952; Taylor , 1964; Guilford , 1965); the essential
feature of such a response being , the pairing of remotely associated
ideas.

Mednick (1962, ?P· 221-222) provided an example which represents

the operational embodiment of original production.
physicist reduced the

p~iring

placing in a fishbowl

l~rge

He described how a

of remotely associated ideas to a method by

numbers of slips of paper, each inscribed
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with a physical f a ct .

The physic ist would then ra ndomly dra w pa i rs of

these f a cts from the fishbowl , looking for new and useful combinat ion s
which otherwise might not have occurred to him.
If one assumes that original production requires su ch an examination

of many pieces of information not commonly assoc iated with a problem,

the finding that the low oogmati c is more original than either the medium
or high dogmatic is interpretabl e .

Rokea c h (1960) found h i gh dogmatics

cling tena ciously to pres c r ibed , conventional rules in problem solving.

Investigating a wide ra nge of behavi ors, Wre nn (1962), Harvey (1963),
Miko l

(1956), Frumkin (1960) and McCarthy and Johnson (1962) all found

high dogmatics to lack independence in th inking .

I n whatever fashion one

views the production of original responses, one point becomes c l e ar from
our d ata: low dogmatics produce mor e origina l responses than high dogmatic s .

The second major vari.abl e e xamine d was spontaneous flexibility .
An analys is of v aria nce sh 1owed the low dogmatic group to be more flexib l e

in their thi nking tha n the high dogmatic group.

The med i um dogmatic

group was not distinguisha.ble from the high dogmatic group.
of flexibili t y in our experimental groups follows.

An example

Given the task of

l i st ing uses other than fo,otwear for a shoe , the high

dogmatic~

would

typically produce a large number of responses such as polish them , fix
them, kick p eople, walk on , run on, receiving a score of z e ro for
flexibility because they htad not broken away from the normal use for a
shoe.

Often the low

dogua~ic

Ss would give fewer r esponses such as to

c rush bugs , tie on car a ftfe r wedding, drink champagne out of , and still

receive a higher s core fer flexibility because they had c hanged the use
for a shoe .

Apparentl y , tlhe low dogmatic !!_ i s more capa ble of shifting

direction and redefining tffie information he must deal with; he does not
stay in a rut, but bran ches out i nto new channels of thought.
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Zagona and Zurcher (1965) came very close to describing the above
relationship in their semester-long classroom observations of high and

low dogmatics.

They noted how the group of high dogmatic students , once

started on a particular task in solving a problem, found it almost

impossible to shift and look at the problem from a different angle.
Although he did not d es cr i be the behavior he observed in terms of
spontaneous flexibility, Rokeach (1960, pp . 171- 182) noted a lack of
flexibility in groups of high dogmatics trying to solve the "doodle - bug"
problem.
Alo ng the dimension of ideational fluency, the analysis of variance

among the experimental groups supported the finding that dogmati sm and
ideational fluency were not correlated.

When the task at hand is the

c alling up of large numbers of solutions to a problem , independent of
originality or flexibility, there was no difference between the performance
of the high and the low dogmatic.
The use of the composite divergent abilities s core was helpful in

emphasizing the trends present in Ss ' performances on the measures '
component parts.

We found the composite divergent a bilities score

negatively correlated with level of dogmatism , while in the experimental
groups high and low dogmatics had significantly different mean divergent
a bilities scores , with the medium group not significa nt l y differing from
the high group.

Thus, if one were to speak of "divergent" ability rather

than the component parts, he would be justified in taking the position
that the more dogmatic an individual, the less he will be able to generate
information where the emphasis is upon variety and quantity of output
from the same source; this operation is the one most clearly involved in

measuring aptitude for creative potential (Guilford and Hoepfner , 1966, p . 3).
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Because of the absence of previous research on the functioning of
medium dogmatics , such a group was constructed in this study, and their
performance analyzed .

It should be noted at this point, that our group

of medium dogmatics was not meaningfully distinguishable in our analysis

of divergent ab i lities.

In most instances , the i r performance was not

significantly different from that of the high dogmatic.

In n o instance

was their performance equal to that of the low dogmatic group.

Level of Dogmatism and Convergent Abilities

Convergent production has been spoken of as production by compelling
inference (Guilford, 1967 , p. 1 71); production where the input of
information is sufficient to determine an answer and where the fo cus is
upon the attainment of conventionally accepted outcomes.

Given this

definition, there was n o reason to suspect that such production would
be related to level of dogmatism, and our hypothesis was so stated .
however , was not the case .

L ~ vel

This,

of dogmatism was negatively correlated

with convergent production in our total sample.

In the analysis of the

extreme groups' performance, it was found that low dogmatics had higher
mean scores than either medium or high dogmatics on convergent production
tests .

The mean medium dogmatics performance was not distinguishable

from the high dogmat ics .
This finding is consistent with Moore's

(1961) finding that the

high dogmatic does not respond to verbal conditioning as readily as the
low dogmatic.

Assuming that verbal praise was reinforcing , Moore

concluded that the high dogmatic cannot discriminate as adequately among
the more obvious stimuli he receives from his environment .

Similar
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inadequate discriminative ability may be operating in the performance
of the high dogmatic subjects on tests of convergent operations.

They

ma y not be capable of making profitable discriminations even when the
focus is upon the logical and the conventional.

However, on the basis

of our data , we can only conclude that the high dogmatics ' performance

tends to be inferior to the low dogmatics ' performance of cognitive
opera tions where sufficient information is present to achieve a conventionally
accepted answer.

Divergent and Convergent Abilities of High and Low Dogmatics

The difference between the high dogmatics ' ability to produce
divergently and convergently seemed cen t r a l
of our experimenta l groups .

t o a thorough descrip t ion

A test of the differences between the high

dogmatics' performances in these two areas was computed .

I t was found

that high dogmatic Ss tend to perform convergent operations better than
they perform divergent operations .

Conversely , it was found that l ow

dogmatics perform convergent and divergent ope r ations equally well.
Guilford ' s research on the structure of intellect has been mainly
descriptive in na ture with a minimal amount of interpretation .

It is,

therefore, difficult to interpret the finding tha t an individual performs
in either a s uperio r or inferior fashion on s p ecific abili t ies, with i n
the theoretical structure of intellect.

A tran sformat ion which this

writer has found useful in examining the findings is the trans lation of
Guilford ' s model of intel l ect into the computer model:

the product s of

intellectual operations being equivalent to output ; the contents of
intellect

being equiva lent to input; a nd the o p e rat i o n s of int e ll e c t being

equivalent to the compu t er p r ogram.
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Give n this model, we can restate the findings of this study in a
more comprehens ible fashion.

With semantic input we have found low

dogmatics to be better programed than high dogmatics to output trans f ormations and classes.

The low dogmatic subject is programed equa lly

well to genera te new information and to gener ate logical, deductive

informat ion.

On the other hand , the highly dogmatic individual has

programs which more readil y output logical conventional information.

Limitations of the Study
Two methodological limitations of the present study are worthy
of note.
l.

It is obvious that the present study only investigated two out

of sixteen defined divergent operations, and two out of fourteen defined
convergent o perations.

Our findings do not re pres ent the total divergent

and convergent abilities of our Ss.

It would be interesting to examine

the relationships between level of dogmatism and divergent- convergent
ability, while varying the input

{content) Ss had to operate on and the

output (products) t h ey had to produce.
2.

As was pointed out in Chapter III , ongoing research indicates

that the sample for this study is more dogmatic than comparable groups
from other geogra phic areas.

Thus,

if the present study were replicated

on a different population , different results might occur.

For example ,

in the present study a lack of linearity was found between level of
dogmatism a nd originality.

Further research on a sample which had a

lower level of dogmatism, and thus more
relationship to actually be linear.

11

lOW 11 dogmatic Ss, might show the

Similarly, we found no meaningful
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distinctions between the medium dogmatics and the high dogmatics .
However, given the level of dogmatism for the total sample, the medium

dogmat ics are a ctually high dogmatics in almost any other geographical
area.

Thus, to conclude that medium dogmatics do not significantly

differ from high dogmatics in divergent and convergent ability, is a
tenuous c on c lusion at best.

Implications

1.

The overriding implication of this study is to offer further

support for the much debated notion that personality factors are correlated
with intellectual abilities (see Med nick and Mednick, 1964; Guilford,
1965).
2.

As McKeachie (1961) has pointed out , we have very little sure

knowledge about what dimens ions of personality are related to the learning
situation .

The findings regarding the intel lectual abilities of our

e xperimental groups seem to have implications for researchers investi gating the intera ction between student personality and teaching style ;
a nd for educators c oncerned with building curr iculum most effective for

differing cognitive styles .
3.

Those interested in the psychotherapeutic process

(Rogers, 1961 ;

Frank, 1961) have stressed the need for the therapist to see the world
as the patient does.

Grasping the phenomenological field of the patient

is seen as a first step in the therapeutic pro cess.
ability

Des cript ions of this

(Rogers, 1961) c l osely resemble what has been described in this

study as spontaneous flexibility .

Thus, the findings from this study

se em to have implications for those involved in selecting applicants for
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clinical training (Kemp, 1961) as well as implications as to a personality
dimension which is negatively correlated with this seemingly crucia l
ability for conducting successful psychothera py.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY

The present investigation was designed to e xamine the relation-

ships between l e v el of dogmatism and divergent- convergent a bilitie s,
as well as the divergent- c onvergent abilities of extreme groups in the

dogmati sm population.
An estimate of level of dogmatism was obtained on an eleventh
grade h i gh s chool class .

From this population, three experimental

groups we re identified .

Th e experimental groups consisted of the Ss

highestin~dogmatism,low e st

dogmatism.

in dogmatism, and a third group, med i um in

. Estimates of d i vergent and convergent a bi lities we r e obtained

on t he total s amples .

Th e foll owing hypothesis were generated on the

basis of previou s res e arch on the relationship between open and closed

belief systems and cognitive abilities :

1.

There will be a negative corre lat ion between dogmatism scores

and originalit y s cor es.
2.

There will be a negative correlation between dogmat i sm scores

a nd s pontaneous flexibility scores.
3.

There will not be a significant c orre lation between s cores on

the dogmatism s c ale a nd ideational fluency s cores.

4.

There will be a negative correlat ion between dogmatism s cor es

a nd the compos i t e divergent abilit ie s scores .

5.

Groups of high a nd low dogmatics will have s ignificantly

different mean spontaneous flexibility s c ores.
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6.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will have significantly different

mean spontaneous flexibility scores.

7.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will not have significantly

different mean ideat ional fluency scores.

8.

Groups of high a nd low dogmatics will have significantly different

mean divergent ability scores.
9.

There will not be a significant correlation between dogmatism

scores and the composite convergent abilities scores.

10.

Groups of high and low dogmatics will not have significantly

different mean convergent abilities scores.

11.

Groups of high dogmatics will have higher mean standard scores

on tests of converqent a bilities than on tests of divergent abilities.

12 .

Groups of low dogmatics will not have higher me an standard

scores on tests of convergent abilities than on tests of divergent

abilities.
There was general support for hypothesis 1 through 8, and 11 and 12.
Hypothesis 9 and 10 were rejected.

It was concluded that level of dogmatism

is negatively correlated with both divergent and convergent ability,

although the highly dogmatic person does function on a higher level when
c onvergent production is the desired end .
These findings were seen as having genera l support for the per-

vasiveness of Rokeach's construct of dogmatism and for the general notion

that personality factors influence intellectua l ability.

The findings

were seen as being meaningful for those enga ged in research on the inter action between student personality and classroom learning, and also for
those engaged in personality research on what constitutes a successful

therapist.
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